Secondly, the Patterson Court defined a "knowing and intelligent" waiver when it held that:
[a]s a general matter, . . an accused who is admonished with the warnings prescribed by this Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 9 ... has been sufficiently apprised of the nature of his sixth amendment rights, and of the consequences of abandoning those rights, so that his waiver on this basis will be considered a knowing and intelligent one.10 In short, the Court held that properly administered Miranda warnings are sufficient to support a sixth amendment waiver of an accused's right to counsel.
In its five to four decision, the majority noted that its holding was narrowly limited to waivers of counsel in post-indictment questioning only,' and specifically, in those situations in which an accused 12 has been informed of his indictment.' 3 The Court also conceded that Miranda compliance would not suffice in all cases of a sixth amendment challenge to the conduct of post-indictment interrogation.' 4 For instance, when law enforcement officials fail to tell the accused that his attorney is attempting to contact him, attachment of the accused's sixth amendment right to counsel would probably rebut an executed waiver.' 5 Thirdly, the Court held that police-initiated questioning can oc-9 384 U.S. 436 (1966) . The Miranda Court held that " [p] rior to any questioning [a] person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id. at 444. 10 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2396-97 (footnote omitted). ' ' Id. at 2395 n.5. 12 In this Note, the term "accused" will refer to a person who is protected by the sixth amendment right to counsel, which assumes that adversarial proceedings have begun. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324-25 (1959)(Douglas, J., concurring)(distinguishing the appellations, "accused" and "suspect"). The word "suspect," on the other hand, will define a person whose right to counsel falls under the fifth amendment protection provided by Miranda. 13 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2396-97 n.8 ("[W]e do not address the question of whether or not an accused must be told that he has been indicted before a post-indictment Sixth Amendment waiver will be valid. Nor do we even pass on the desirability of so informing the accused-a matter that [could] be reasonably debated.").
14 Id. at 2393 n.3. 15 Id. In the pre-indictment setting of Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986), police followed Miranda procedures in obtaining the suspect's written waivers of his fifth amendment rights prior to securing his confession. Id. at 415. The Moran Court held that the Miranda waiver would stand even though the police had not only failed to inform the suspect that his attorney had called to state her intention of representing him during questioning, but had also deceived counsel as to when the suspect would be interrogated. Id. at 432. The holding of the Patterson Court intimates that this waiver would not be valid once the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel attaches because it is at this point that the attorney-client relationship is protected from any interference by law enforcement officials. Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2397 n.9. cur after the sixth amendment right to counsel has attached. 16 In doing so, the majority rejected Patterson's argument that the attachment of the sixth amendment right to counsel should be equated to an invocation of the fifth amendment right to counsel.' 7 This Note examines the Patterson opinions and concludes that in its effort to define when post-indictment interrogation may take place without the assistance of counsel, the Court has reached a narrow holding which 1) erodes the sixth amendment right to counsel of indicted persons which safeguards the accused from the powers of the state's prosecutor once the adversary process has begun; 2) drastically understates the benefits of counsel during post-indictment interrogation to the accused; and 3) consequently, finds an "intelligent" waiver in circumstances in which the accused cannot be sufficiently apprised of the consequences of abandoning his right. This Note reasons that the fifth amendment formula for waiver, applied by Patterson to the sixth amendment context, is less desirable than the dissent's alternative, which is to allow post-indictment interrogation only when the defendant's counsel has either been notified or is present, or when the state has secured permission from the Court. This Note concludes that the constitutional principles and procedural waiver requirements forwarded by the holding of Patterson v. Illinois are contradictory to our adversary system ofjustice and should be reversed.
Furthermore, this Note concludes that the Court should have adopted the additional procedural requirement of informing the accused of his indictment before a valid waiver can be executed.
II. FACTS
In the early morning of August 21, 1983, seventeen-year-old Tyrone Patterson attended a party. The party roster included nine members of the Vice Lords street gang, with whom Patterson was affiliated, and thirty to forty members of a rival gang, the Black Mobsters. 18 During the party, Patterson saw a fight break out between a guest and members of the Vice Lords. He attempted to verbally 16 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2394. 17 Id. Patterson's claim here rested on the holding of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) . The Edwards Court held that if a pre-indictment suspect, who is being questioned, invokes his fifth ammendment right to have counsel present, he cannot thereafter be interrogated again unless he initiates the meeting. Id. at 484.
18 Joint Appendix at 19, People v. Thomas, 116 Ill. 2d 290, 507 N.E.2d 843 (1987)(Nos. 63144, 63149)(Patterson was jointly tried with co-defendant David Thomas).
intervene, but failed when the guest engaged him in fisticuffs. 19 Coinciding with Patterson's rhubarb, another fight broke out between the Vice Lords and the Black Mobsters. At this point, Patterson and his friends-Juan McCune, David Thomas, and Carl Harmon; all members of the Vice Lords-ran away from the party. Two Black Mobsters chased them. 20 Patterson and his friends ran to a place called the 1623 Club where they briefly confronted their two pursuers. 2 ' They then fled from this fight when four carloads of Black Mobsters approached.
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After moving from one location to another, the four ended up at Thomas' home. 23 While standing in front of the Thomas house, a former member of the Black Mobsters, James Jackson, drove up and called out, "What do you want?" Carl Harmon retorted, "What do you mean what do we want?" 24 He then walked over to the car, got in, removed the ignition key and began striking Jackson. Harmon dragged Jackson from the automobile and continued to severely beat him. 25 At one point, Jackson reached out and struck Patterson who retaliated several times with his fists and with the victim's own shoe, which had previously flown off. 2 6 The four then placed Jackson back into the car and drove him to a small park at the end of a nearby street. 2 7 Once there, Harmon threw the former Black Mobster from the automobile, repeatedly struck him, and then drowned him in a mud puddle. The four scattered from the scene, leaving the dead body face down in the water. The police discovered Jackson in this position later that morning. 28 McCune, Thomas, and Patterson were separately arrested that afternoon on warrants obtained by police for charges stemming from the fight at the 1623 Club. McCune was taken into custody first. 29 During questioning, McCune waived his Miranda rights and confessed to his involvement in both the gang fights and theJackson murder; his statement also implicated Patterson, Thomas, and Harmon. Patterson was subsequently arrested a few hours later and was read his rights as required under Miranda v. Arizona. 3 ' Patterson stated that he understood his rights and volunteered a statement regarding the fight at the 1623 Club. Patterson asserted, however, that he did not know anything about Jackson's murder. 3 2 Patterson remained in police custody through the next day, while the State Attorney's office and police completed their investigation. 3 On the morning of August 23, Patterson and the other suspects were removed from detention in the holding cells and brought to the detective bureau. Patterson was separated from the others and was informed by the arresting officer, Michael Gresham, that he had been indicted for the offenses of murder and armed violence. After showing Patterson the form, Smith inquired as to whether Patterson had read the waiver, had understood the rights enumerated on the form, had initialed each warning, and had signed the document. Patterson answered affirmatively. 4 5 Smith then read the complete form aloud and again questioned Patterson if he understood the rights just explained. Patterson indicated that he did, at which point Smith signed the waiver form.
46
Following this discourse Smith reported to Patterson that he was an assistant State's Attorney working in the felony review unit. In addition, Smith stated that he was not his lawyer, but rather an attorney cooperating with police in the Jackson murder investigation. 4 7 Patterson proclaimed that he understood Smith's position and proceeded to give another inculpatory statement concerning the crime. According to Smith's testimony at trial, Patterson noted that the statement was delivered of his own free will, with no threats or promises being made to him, and that he was providing the statement voluntarily because it was the truth. [Vol. 79
Prior to trial, Patterson moved to supress his statements to police claiming, in part, that they were taken in violation of certain constitutionally guaranteed rights. 49 The trial court denied Patterson's motions and the statements were used against him. On this evidence, the jury found Patterson guilty of murder and sentenced him to twenty-four years in prison. 50 At the appellate levels, 51 Patterson argued that the trial court erred in admitting Patterson's uncounseled post-indictment statements to Officer Gresham and Smith because Patterson had not effected a waiver which sufficiently satisfied the "knowing and intelligent" minimum standard required by the United States Supreme Court.
52
The United States Supreme Court has defined a waiver of the sixth amendment right to counsel as being valid only if it evidences "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."1 5 3 According to Moran v. Burbine, 54 this means that the accused must possess "'a full awareness [of] both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.' "55
Patterson contended that neither the admonitions required by Miranda under the fifth amendment nor his knowledge of the fact that he had been indicted for Jackson's murder afforded him sufficient information to evince a knowing and intelligent waiver. 5 6 The crux of Patterson's proposition was that the State should have to satisfy a higher burden to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver of the sixth amendment right to counsel than is necessary to establish a waiver of the right to counsel guaranteed in Miranda.
7
Although the Illinois Supreme Court found that Patterson's sixth amendment right to counsel had definitely attached at the time he gave his statements to law enforcement officials, that court rejected Patterson's argument. 58 The court premised its holding on a Furthermore, Smith's testimony could not be confirmed by Patterson because he did not testify at trial. Id. at 28. 49 prior Illinois Supreme Court decision, People v. Owens, 59 which had held that "Miranda warnings were sufficient to make a defendant aware of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during post-indictment questioning."
60
In the present case, the Illinois Supreme Court found that Patterson understood his constitutional rights prior to post-indictment interrogation because he was advised of his Miranda rights and he indicated that he understood them. 6 1 The court further found that Patterson was aware of the gravity of his situation because he knew that he had been indicted on the murder charge before he gave his statements to Gresham and Smith. 6 2 Therefore, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that Patterson "knowingly and intelligently waived his sixth amendment right to counsel." 6 3
The United States Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari, 64 to decide the waiver issue which the lower courts had left unresolved and which the Court had not addressed in its previous decisions. 67 By rejecting Patterson's claim, which challenged the elicited, inculpatory admissions as sixth amendment violative, the Court sanctioned the admission of those statements as evidence to be used against him at his trial. 68 In writing for the ma-jority, 6 9 Justice White analogized Patterson's post-indictment position to that of a pre-indicted suspect, who has similarly declined counseled representation, and equated the function of counsel at post-indictment interrogation to an attorney's role at pre-indictment questioning. 70 The majority reasoned that the similarity of the two stages of interrogation supports the argument that, if Miranda warnings are adequate to evince a "knowing and intelligent" waiver in a fifth amendment setting, then they should be equally applicable to a sixth amendment context. 7 Addressing the first issue, the majority dismissed Patterson's claim that, since his sixth amendment right had previously come into existence, the police should have been barred from questioning him. 77 Justice White said that Patterson's reasoning was faulty because interrogation restrictions, both in a fifth and sixth amendment context, arise only when the accused asserts his right to counsel. 78 This prerequisite, he concluded, was not met in Patterson's case. 79 The majority recognized that if Patterson had "indicated he wanted the assistance of counsel, the authorities' interview with him would have been stopped, and further questioning would have been forbidden. 8 0 However, since Patterson gave no such indication, 8 ' the majority rejected his argument, and further supported its conclusion by analogizing Patterson to a pre-indictment interrogatee who similarly has an available right to counsel under the fifth amendment, but does not assert that right. majority, the Supreme Court rejected the validity of a fifth amendment waiver, holding that once a suspect has invoked his right to counsel, a waiver cannot exist unless the suspect later intiates a meeting with police. 5 Justice White distinguished Edwards from Patterson's case 8 6 by noting that the fifth amendment-violative questioning in Edwards hinged on the defendant's previously expressed desire to deal with law enforcement officials only through counsel; 8 7 a factor missing from Patterson's circumstances. 8 8 Thus, even though indictment signals the attachment of an accused's sixth amendment right to have counsel present at post-indictment interviews, if he or she at no time seeks to exercise that right, law enforcement officials will not be barred from intiating a meeting with the accused. 8 9 Justice White then added that the theory behind Edwards and its progeny was not formulated in order to restrict an accused from choosing to confront state officials with or without counsel, but rather to preserve "the integrity of an accused's right to communicate with police only through counsel." 90 Therefore, if Patterson "knowingly and intelligently" chose to face police without counsel, the majority said it could "see no reason why the uncounseled statements he then [made] must be excluded at his trial." 9 1
The majority then considered Patterson's second claim that his sixth amendment rights were violated because he did not "knowingly and intelligently" waive his right to have counsel present at the post-indictment questioning. amendment right to counsel. 9 3 Having reviewed the parameters set by Supreme Court precedents, 9 4 the majority surmised that: the key inquiry in a case such as this one must be: Was the accused, who waived his sixth amendment rights during post-indictment questioning, made sufficiently aware of his right to have counsel present during the questioning, and of the possible consequences of a decision to forgo the aid of counsel? 95 Answering this "key inquiry" affirmatively, Justice White concluded that the Miranda warnings, given to Patterson prior to his statements, served the function of both making him sufficiently aware of his sixth amendment right to counsel and alerting him to the possible consequences of waiving this right.
96
With respect to the "knowing" half of the standard, Patterson claimed that, because the Miranda warnings were designed by the Court to specifically inform a suspect of his fifth amendment right to counsel, they were insufficient to let him know of his sixth amendment right to counsel. The majority rejected this argument on the grounds that the wording of the Miranda warnings, given to Patterson by state officials, comprised the "sum and substance" of his sixth amendment rights.
97
In a fifth amendment context, the Court said, Miranda requires that the suspect be told that he has a right to remain silent and a right to the presence of an attorney, retained or appointed. 9 8 The majority doubted that any augmentation of the language required by Miranda would have better or more completely communicated the existence of the accused's sixth amendment right to counsel in 93 Id. at 2395. 94 Id. at 2393. In Patterson, the majority relied on Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), a sixth amendment waiver case, in which the Court held that waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege; a matter which depends in each case upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience and conduct of the defendant. At the time Patterson went to trial, procedural requirements for waiver of the sixth amendment right to counsel were much less defined than those pertaining to the fifth amendment waiver, which are comparatively uniform and clear. [Vol. 79this case. 9 9 Thus, the Court held that Patterson's receipt of his fifth amendment warnings satisfied the "knowing" portion of the waiver inquiry in a sixth amendment setting. 10 0 Turning to the "intelligent" component of the waiver standard, the majority again focused on the proffered Miranda warnings. More specifically, the Court concentrated on that segment of the warnings which dictate that an accused be told that, if he abandons his rights, whatever he says "can be used against him in a court of law."'' 1 1 Justice White held that this warning made Patterson sufficiently aware of the possible consequences of forsaking his sixth amendment right to an attorney. 1 0 2 The majority reasoned that the warning accomplishes this by apprising the accused of "the ultimate adverse consequence [he could suffer] by virtue of his choice to make uncounseled admissions to the authorities" 1 03 -that is, the use of his own words against him in subsequent criminal proceedings.
The Court buttressed its conclusion, that the current language in Miranda would suffice, by noting that Patterson's lawyer failed to articulate any modifying wordage which would have meaningfully increased Patterson's awareness of the consequences he faced by disposing of counsel.' 0 4 The majority further pointed out that the accused's recognition of these consequences need not be a full and complete one. 10 5 The Court applied the constitutional minimum set out in Oregon v. Elstad, 10 6 which held that an extensive "appreciation of all of the consequences flowing from the waiver"1 0 7 is not neces- 107 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2396 (quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 316-17). In the fifth amendment setting of Elstad, the suspect was taken into custody at his home, was questioned by the arresting officers without the benefit of Miranda warnings, and subsequently gave a short incriminating statement. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 300. He was interrogated again at the police station, after being read his Miranda rights, and responded with a more detailed statement with greater inculpatory facts. Id. at 300-01. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the second statement because the careful and thorough administration of the Miranda warnings served to inform the suspect of his rights prior to elicitation. Id. at 310-11.
The suspect argued that his waiver, made prior to the second statement, should be overruled. He reasoned that the waiver was less than fully informed because he had not been told that his first statement could not be used against him due to the Miranda violation. Id. at 316. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that " [t] his Court has never embraced the theory that the defendant's ignorance of the full consequences of his decisions vitiates their voluntariness." Id. The Court reasoned that the sary for the State to meet its burden of proof.' 0 8 Thus, the Court held that Patterson's receipt of his fifth amendment warnings also satisfied the "intelligent" portion of the waiver inquiry in a sixth amendment context.1 0 9
Patterson had argued that there existed post-waiver consequences, which only his lawyer could properly inform him about.
10
Commenting on the scope of information that an accused should receive prior to waiving his sixth amendment right to counsel, Patterson suggested that any warning must inform the accused of two basic factors: the benefits he could obtain by having the aid of counsel while making statements to state officials; and "the gravity of [his] situation."' 1 1 The essence of Patterson's claim was that the fifth amendment Miranda warnings had failed in these respects, and therefore, his waiver was invalid.
Speaking first to the latter of these requirements, Justice White dispelled the necessity of this information in two ways. First, the majority reasoned that Patterson had surely been notified of the gravity of his situation when he learned that he had been indicted for the charge of murder.' 1 2 Second, the Court emphasized that letting an accused know of his indictment status has not been determined to be a requirement of the waiver inquiry and must be further examined.
1 3 However, since this issue was mooted by the fact that Patterson had been so informed, the Court explicitly refrained from deciding "the question of whether or not an accused must be told that he has been indicted before a post-indictment Sixth Amendment waiver will be valid."
' 1 4 Nor would the Court "even pass on the desirability of so informing the accused-a matter that [could] reasonably be debated."' 1 5
In considering the former requirement suggested by Patterson that he be apprised of the beneficial protection counsel could provide during post-indictment questioning, the Court acknowledged that this was indeed a consequence of the waiver which must be police should not be expected to give the suspect legal advice as to the inadmissibility of his earlier statement because the suspect has a right to an attorney, whose job includes explaining the admissible status of unwarned statements. Id. communicated, 1 16 but said that it had been accounted for by the language of Miranda. 117 Justice White stated that since fifth amendment admonitions made Patterson aware that his statements could be used against him in court, the warnings also sufficed to let Patterson know what benefits could accrue from having an attorney present at such statements. 1 8
The Court's analysis here was predicated on the majority's perception that counsel's role during post-indictment interrogations is relatively simple and limited when compared with counsel's needed procedural expertise at later stages of criminal proceedings.' 1 9 The Court reasoned that:
[a]t trial, an accused needs an attorney to perform several varied functions-some of which are entirely beyond even the most intelligent layman. Yet during postindictment questioning, a lawyer's role is rather unidimensional: largely limited to advising his client as to what questions to answer and which ones to decline to answer.
1 20
In other words, if Patterson knew that, following an executed waiver, any inculpatory statements made could be admitted as evidence against him, then he must have likewise known that the sole benefit of having counsel present-keeping him from making such statements-would also be waived.
12 1
In his brief, Patterson rebutted the argument that Miranda warnings, which were designed to admonish a suspect of his fifth amendment right to counsel in a custodial setting, should be sufficient to waive the right to counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment, which attaches after the adversarial process has begun. 122 Patterson's claim rested on the analysis that the difference in policies giving rise to these two distinct rights causes the sixth amendment right to counsel to be of a superior nature and, consequently, more difficult to waive than the fifth amendment guarantee. 123 The Court held that while there is a difference between fifth amendment and sixth amendment rights to counsel, as well as different policies behind such constitutional guarantees, the sixth amendment right to 116 Id. at 2395-96. The Court never explicitly stated this point, but the Court's treatment of counsel's absence, as a consequence of an executed waiver, implies this conclusion. counsel is not superior to the fifth amendment right. 1 24 In supporting its conclusion on this point, the majority rejected Patterson's hierarchy-based analysis of the right to counsel and opted for a more "pragmatic approach."' ' 25 The Court defined this "pragmatic approach" to the waiver question as one which "focuses more on the lawyer's role during such questioning, rather than the particular constitutional guarantee that gives rise to the right to counsel at that proceeding."' ' 2 6
The Court then examined what purposes a lawyer serves and what assistance he lends to a defendant during specific stages of the criminal proceedings. 12 7 After reviewing precedents, 12 8 in which the Court had decided the waiver question in a variety of stages in the criminal process, the Court held that the waiver inquiry depends on a "pragmatic assessment of the usefulness of counsel to the accused at the particular proceeding," during which he may have to deal with legal problems or face his adversary, "and the dangers to the accused of proceeding without counsel. An accused's waiver of his right to counsel is 'knowing' when he is made aware of these basic facts." 1 29 Applying its "pragmatic approach" to the present case, the Court compared counsel's role during questioning of a suspect in a fifth amendment context to the interrogation of an accused in a sixth amendment setting. 130 The majority held that the usefulness of counsel does not increase solely because the state has initiated the adversary process; an attorney's role at interrogation is analogously simple and limited in both the fifth and sixth amendment contexts.' 3 1 Therefore, Justice White concluded: 124 Id. at 2397. 125 Id. 126 Id. at 2397-98. 127 Id. at 2398. 128 Id. The majority viewed the waiver inquiry as establishing a spectrum of situations during the adversary process in which the validity of a waiver would be viewed in light of the attorney's role in providing the accused with "'aid in coping with legal problems or assistance in meeting his adversary. ' 
Justice Blackmun's Dissent
Justices Blackmun and Stevens dissented from the majority in separate opinions. i3 4 Justice Blackmun concluded in his dissent 3 5 that "after formal adversary proceedings against a defendant have been commenced, the Sixth Amendment mandates that the defendant not be 'subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.' "136 Justice Blackmun also dissented from the majority's holding that counsel's function at post-indictment interrogation is equivalent to counsel's function at pre-indictment interrogation.1 3 7
He found this holding to be unconstitutional in light of Carnley v. Cochran,1 38 and emphasized that "the Sixth Amendment does not allow the prosecution to take undue advantage of any gap between the commencement of the adversary process and the time at which counsel is appointed for a defendant." 13 9
Justice Stevens' Dissent
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, condifference between the usefulness of a lawyer to a suspect during custodial interrogation, and his value to an accused at post-indictment questioning.
Id. (footnote omitted).
132 Id cluded that Miranda warnings are inadequate to apprise an accused of the information needed to execute a "knowing and intelligent" waiver of his sixth amendment right to have counsel present during post-indictment questioning. 40 Justice Stevens argued that the adequacy or effectiveness of any legal advice given to the accused, Miranda warnings included, is undermined by the adversarial position of the state official who gives such advice. 14 1 According to Justice Stevens, the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings makes all subsequent, government advice, in uncounseled, state-initiated interrogation, unethical and sixth amendment violative. 142 Justice Stevens supported his dissenting opinion by pointing to Supreme Court precedents that critically emphasized the significance of legal representation once adversary judicial proceedings have begun.' 43 The majority opinion, he stated, "backs away from the significance previously attributed to the initiation of formal proceedings" by reaching a decision "favorable to the interest in law enforcement unfettered by process concerns."' 4 4 He further buttressed his argument with established procedural and social policy reasons, under which the majority holding would be characterized as promoting unethical and unfair trial practice. Justice Stevens first challenged that part of the majority's argument which equated "the purported waiver in this case with... that of an unindicted suspect." 1 57 Citing Supreme Court precedents that critically emphasized the importance of the initiation of adversary proceedings to the waiver inquiry,1 58 Justice Stevens concluded that "in reaching a decision ... favorable to the interest in law enforcement unfettered by process concerns, the Court backs away from the significance previously attributed to the initiation of formal
Further relying on these precedents, the dissent noted that important distinctions exist between a pre-indictment interrogatee and a post-indictment interrogatee.
The return of an indictment, or like instrument substantially alters the relationship between the state and the accused. Only after a formal accusation has "the government.., committed itself to prosecute, and only then [have] the adverse positions of government and defendant ... solidified." . . . Moreover, the return of an indictment also presumably signals the government's conclusion that it has sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. As a result, any further interrogation can only be designed to buttress the government's case; authorities are no longer simply attempting "to solve a crime."' 160 "Given the significance of the initiation of formal proceedings and the concomitant shift in the relationship between the state and the accused," Justice Stevens concluded that it is "quite wrong to suggest that Miranda warnings-or for that matter, any warnings offered by an adverse party-provide a sufficient basis for permitting the the prosecutor, or his or her agents, without notice to the defendant's lawyer and without the permission of the court." Id. at 2400 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 156 Id. at 2401 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority disagreed with this conclusion. Instead, the Court reasoned that, because counsel's function at post-indictment interrogation is equivalent to counsel's function at pre-indictment interrogation, the attachment of the accused's sixth amendment right to counsel "does not distinguish him from the pre-indictment interrogatee." 1d. at 2394. Furthermore, the majority held, if the accused is in the same position as a pre-indictment interrogatee, then he can effectively waive his right to counsel; and the Miranda warnings are a sufficient vehicle for this waiver. Id. In disposing of the majority's argument here, Justice Stevens criticized each level of the reasoning. undoubtedly However, in Justice Stevens' view, the failure of the Miranda warnings to satisfy this burden does not obviate the need for at least some case-particular advice from a judicial officer which lets the 161 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2404 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 162 Id. at 2397. 163 Id. at 2395. 164 Id. at 2403 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 165 Id. at 2403 n.4. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority either vacated this argument or failed to consider it because their holding clearly indicates a belief (a) that some universal boilerplate formula exists for sixth amendment Miranda warnings, and (b) that an adversarial party can effectively communicate it to an accused. This is evidenced by the majority's reliance on Patterson's failure to articulate with precision any additional information for the Miranda warnings which would more clearly advise an accused of the benefits he is abandoning through waiver. Justice Stevens pointedly disagreed with this belief when he stated that each criminal proceeding is different, and therefore, each set of warnings given to an accused must be case-particular. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
In addition, Justice Stevens noted that the requirements for waiver, as defined in Supreme Court precedents, set a high threshold of sufficiency which cannot be overcome by warnings offered by an opposing party, no matter how detailed the content. Id. at 2403-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 166 Id.(Stevens,J., dissenting).
accused know of the "dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation." 167 Concentrating on the fact that some form of case-particular advice must be imparted to the accused prior to the execution of a valid waiver, Justice Stevens continued on to argue that it would be unethical for the prosecutor, or his or her agents, to provide such advice. 16 Second, Justice Stevens recognized that "the offering of legal advice may lead an accused to underestimate the prosecuting authorities' true adversary posture." 1 72 Third, he noted that the adversary positioning of the parties will make the prosecutor's advice tainted and awry, regardless of the prosecutor's efforts to be unbiased, because his job is to represent the state, not the accused. 173 Lastly, Justice Stevens pointed out that the prosecutor's conflict of interest and the resulting disadvantageous position of the defendant, portrays to the public a "perception of unfairness and unethical conduct" within the judicial system.
174 According to Justice Stevens, this portrayal 167 Id. at 2403 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 168 Id. at 2403-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 169 624 F.2d 1140 (1980). 170 Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A) provides: During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not: (1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so. goes against the courts' interest of "ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them." 1 75 The dissent concluded that the policy reasons discussed above should prevent the formation of a valid waiver when that waiver depends upon the giving of legal advice by a prosecutor-an accused's adversary.
176
In summary, Justice Stevens prefers the "easily identifiable" rule of forcing law enforcement officials to refrain from interrogating an accused once adversary proceedings are initiated, unless they either notify the accused's lawyer or receive authorization from the court. 177 This, according to the dissent, is the clear mandate of the sixth amendment right to counsel.' 78 
IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

A. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL: DIFFERENCES IN THE UNDERLYING
POLICIES AND THE TIMES OF ATTACHMENT
The constitutional guarantee of the right to counsel is granted by both the fifth' 79 and sixth amendments.' 80 However, the policies that give rise to these guarantees and the times at which these rights attach are separate and distinct.
The fifth amendment right to counsel was judicially created under the holding of Miranda v. Arizona.' 8 ' The Miranda Court expressly was aware of the impact on the suspect's mind of the interplay between police interrogation and police custody-each reinforcing the pressures and anxieties produced by the other.1 8 2 It was this impact, the Court said, that makes "custodial police interro-
DILEMMAS & DEciSIONS (1989).
Discussing the ethics of police using deception during investigations and interrogations, the author stated that "[miany people see nothing wrong-certainly nothing illegal-in using any methods necessary to catch criminals. Id. at 93. The author concluded that "[ilt is unlikely that [deceptive] investigative techniques will ever be eliminated; perhaps they should not be, since they are effective in catching a number of people who should be punished. Even if one has doubtsabout the ethics of these practices, it is entirely possible that there is no other way to accomplish the task at hand." Id. at 95. gation" so devastating. 1 83 In order to counteract this impact and to protect the suspect's right against compelled self-incrimination, the Court adopted a number of prophylactic procedural requirements to be applied during the "custodial interrogation" process. 8 4 One of these procedural requirements, mandated by Miranda, was the duty of the state to inform a suspect of his right to have counsel present during "custodial interrogation."'1 8 5
In contrast to the "custodial" scope of the fifth amendment right to counsel, the sixth amendment right was intially intended to preserve the accused's privilege to secure representation of counsel at trial.' 8 The Powell opinion strongly suggested that in all but the most exceptional cases, appointment of counsel is necessary to ensure a fair trial.1 8 9 Powell's language emphatically stressed the inability of even an "intelligent and educated layman" to properly represent himself, and concluded that there was a need for "the guiding hand of counsel at every step of the proceedings. 
S. 315 (1959).
In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas affirmatively stated that a Constitution which guarantees a defendant the aid of counsel at trial must provide no less to an indicted defendant who is being questioned by law enforcement officials in a completely extrajudicial proceeding. Id. at 326 (Douglas, J., concurring). To provide less than this, he said, might deny a defendant "effective representation by counsel at the only stage when legal aid and advice would help him." Id. further expanded to provide counsel to an accused at "critical stages" of the crimiial proceeding.' 9 3 Finally, in 1972, Kirby v. Illinois, 1 9 4 concretely qualified the attachment of an accused's sixth amendment right to counsel as being triggered at or after the initiation of adversarial proceedings1 9 5 -which the Court defined as the implementation of a "formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment."' 9 6
Thus, the fifth and sixth amendment rights to counsel differ in the policies giving rise to each. The fifth amendment protects a suspect from' compulsory self-incrimination. In contrast, the sixth amendment protects an accused's privilege to deal with post-indictment adversaries through counsel.
201 (1977), in which the Court held in a six to three decision that the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches when the defendant is indicted; thereby prohibiting state extraction of incriminating statements without the presence of counsel, absent a valid waiver. Id. at 205-07. In Massiah, the defendant had been indicted and had retained a lawyer prior to engaging in an incriminating conversation with an informant who was bugged by the police. Id. at 202-03.
193 For instance an arraignment is a "critical stage" of the trial when the state fails to provide the defendant with the assistance of counsel. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961)(The prosecution challenged the defendant's late entry of an insanity plea as being irretrievably lost, but the Supreme Court, ruling in favor of the defendant, concluded that, whether defendant would have actually raised the insanity defense or not "can never be known" because only counsel present at the time "could have enabled the accused to know all the defenses available to him and to plead intelligently."). The intiation ofjudicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere formalism. It is the starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice. For it is only then that the government has committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law. It is this point, therefore, that marks the commencment of the "criminal prosecutions" to which alone the explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are applicable. These rights to counsel also differ in when they attach during the criminal process. During "custodial interrogation" fifth amendment rights attach. 19 7 Conversely, during "every stage of the adversarial proceedings" sixth amendment rights attach. We conclude that the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected either to express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01 (emphasis added).
203 "[A]n accused ... having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been [Vol. 79
By comparison, the procedural requirements for waiver of the sixth amendment right to counsel, prior to Patterson, have been far less well defined. Nevertheless, the pre-Patterson Supreme Court cases, which addressed the waiver question, established a trend of strictly applying the broad, albeit unclear, procedural requirements. Therefore, if a court was to err, it would err in favor of protecting the accused's right to counsel.
4
The first test of a waiver, stated in the 1938 Supreme Court case of Johnson v. Zerbst, 20 5 was defined as being applicable to those fundamental constitutional rights which are intended to protect a fair trial and the reliability of the truth-determining process. 2 0 6 The sixth amendment right to have counsel certainly falls within this subset. The waiver standard, set by Johnson, was general in scope: a valid waiver must be based on "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." 20 7 Regardless of its generality, it is a strict standard that is evaluated (a) under "every reasonable presumption against waiver," '20 8 and (b) within the particular facts surrounding the assertion of waiver. 20 9 Johnson, however, dealt only with a situation in which the accused was denied representation of counsel at trial, and consequently, did not provide much in the way of specifics for an assertion of waiver at the postindictment questioning stage.
Applying the Johnson test to an accused's choice to proceed pro se at trial, against the warnings of the judge, the Court in Faretta v. California 2 10 held that a sixth amendment waiver of counsel at trial will be invalid unless the judge communicates "the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that '[the accused] knows what he is doing and his choice is made made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication." Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) . Therefore, a two-step analysis must be used. It must be determined (i) whether the defendant "initiated" the further conversation and, if so, (ii) whether he thereafter waived his right to counsel. with eyes open.' "211 This strengthenedJohnson standard, described in Faretta, was buttressed further by Brewer v. Williams, 2 12 which unequivocally established that the burden of persuasion rests heavily on the state when trying to prove that an accused "knowingly and intelligently" waived his sixth amendment right to have counsel present at post-indictment interrogation. 2 13 Thus, prior to Patterson, even though the procedural requirements for waiver at the post-indictment stage were somewhat unclear in scope, 2 14 they were strictly applied on a case-by-case basis in order to fully protect the accused's rights during the adversarial process. Furthermore, the Supreme Court parameters of what constituted a violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel were very broad, emphasizing, prior to Patterson, an air of extreme restrictiveness on the investigatory conduct of state officials during post-indictment questioning. At the time Patterson reached the Supreme Court, a sixth amendment violation was defined as being a "deliberate elicitation," by the state, of an accused's inculpatory statement, in the absence of an executed waiver. 213 Id. at 403. 214 Prior to Patterson, the holding in Brewer encompassed the most recent requirement for waiver. In Brewer, the Supreme Court decided the question of sixth amendment waiver by focusing on the state's investigatory conduct. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 404-05. Brewer rejected a sixth amendment waiver, holding that the state's "deliberate elicitation" of Williams' incriminating statements, in the absence of his counsel, violated his sixth amendment rights; and therefore, waiver was deemed impossible. Id.
Yet, the Supreme Court's focus on "deliberate elicitation" failed to provide any meaningful foundation for clear requirements to the waiver inquiry because the Court never found waiver in a case involving "deliberate elicitation." Id. Thus, the composition of clear procedural requirements for sixth amendment waiver cases had been primarily left to the circuit and state courts, which invented varied and contradictory standards. cooperating and bugged codefendant, "deliberately elicited" uncounseled incriminating statements from the accused in the accused's automobile. 2 18 Likewise, in Williams, a confessionprovoking speech, orated by'a police officer while transporting the accused to another county, was held to have violated the accused's right to counsel because the detective "deliberately and designedly set out to elicit information from Williams," after he had repeatedly requested counsel's assistance. 2 1 9 These cases have found violations of the accused's sixth amendment right to counsel when the accused was neither in custody, nor being interrogated, nor was even aware that the police were eliciting information from him.
C. PATTERSON'S DISREGARD FOR THE "PRESUMPTION AGAINST WAIVER" PRECEDENT
These Supreme Court cases portray a willingness to find violations of the sixth amendment right to counsel beyond the post-indictment interrogational setting of Patterson. Concomitantly, these cases also evince a high threshold for the establishment of valid waivers, in which the state bears a heavy burden of proof. Thus, pre-Patterson decisions-in the spirit of Powell and its progenystressed protection of the accused's right to counsel; and, consequently, did not strive to rationalize an easing of the restraints on state investigatory conduct. An example of this is the holding of People v. Settles, 2 20 which held:
[N]o knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel may be said to have occurred without the essential presence of counsel. True, a defendant would be appreciably less inclined to waive counsel when sufficiently apprised of the effects of that waiver by an attorney.... That is not the point. At the time when legal advice is most critically needed, [the New York Constitution] strikes the balance in favor of the defendant by placing a buffer, in the form of an attorney, between himself and the coercive power of the State.
1
In contrast, the Court in Patterson disregarded the "strong presumption against waiver" trend 2 22 which emphasized the critical differences in policy and attachment of the two constitutional guarantees, and maintained a low threshold for sixth amendment violations. 223 Instead, Patterson has promoted an easing of the restraints on state investigatory conduct at post-indictment Although the majority opted for the former standard, the latter of these procedural formulas is more desirable for a number of reasons.
It may be conceded that Miranda warnings do effectively inform the accused that he has a right to counsel. However, it cannot be convincingly argued that these warnings sufficiently apprise the accused of "the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation" Justice Stevens appropriately characterized this argument as an understatement of "what a lawyer can do for" the accused. 230 As Justice Stevens pointed out, an attorney, by virtue of his or her presumably greater knowledge of available substantive and procedural defenses, provides benefits necessary to ensure a fair trial. 23 [t] he right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with a crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad ....
Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge ....
He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every consequence of waived representation, counsel would not be present: (1) to "examine the indictment for legal sufficiency;" 23 2 (2) to determine the prudence of cooperating or remaining silent by being more able to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the evidence against the accused, given the specified facts about the accused's age, and the nature and circumstances of the offense; 23 3 (3) to determine whether plea-bargaining "negotiations may be most fruitful if initiated prior to any interrogation;" 234 (4) to skillfully negotiate such a plea-bargain; 23 5 and (5) "to explain to the accused the nature of the charges pending against him." ' 2 36 The words, "anything [you] might say can be used against [you]," 23 7 simply do not make the accused aware of the attorney benefits listed here, 23 8 which are part and parcel "of the 'dangers and disadvantages of self-representation' during questioning." 23 9
The majority circumvented the need to inform the accused of the above listed advantages, 240 by stating that such information is unnecessary and not part of the constitutional minimum required under Oregon v. Elstad. 2 41 This is a questionable application of Elstad. In Elstad, the defendant made two inculpatory statements to police, the first of which was not preceded by an issuance of his Miranda warnings. 2 4 2 In an appeal to suppress his highly inculpatory second statement, the defendant argued that he was unable to give a fully informed waiver of his rights the second time around because he was unaware that his initial, unwarned statement could not be used against him.
2 43 The Court based its rejection of this argument on the fact that " [t] he standard Miranda warnings explicitly inform[ed] the suspect of his right to consult a lawyer before speaking." ' 244 The Court reasoned that "[p]olice officers are ill-equipped to pinch-hit for counsel, construing the murky and difficult questions of when 'custody' begins or whether a given unwarned statement will ultimately be held inadmissible."
4 5
Elstad's reasoning indicates that the Supreme Court has granted the defendant a right to counsel in Miranda so that "the murky and difficult questions" 24 6 surrounding interrogation can be properly addressed by a defending lawyer and not by the police. Consequently, Elstad concludes that, because it is the lawyer's job to explain the legalities of a waiver to the accused, the state has no duty to communicate "a full and complete appreciation of all of the consequences flowing" 2 47 from a defendant's waiver. Thus, the very case Patterson employs to support its argument is based on inapposite reasoning. Patterson used Elstad to prove that it is sufficient for the state to inform the accused of only two waiver-consequences: that his words may be used against him; and that he will dispose of counsel's only beneficial function-keeping him from making inculpatory statements. 24 8 In contrast, Elstad emphasized the importance of the right to counsel, as well as the unique and necessary functions counsel performs for the defendant. 249 In fact, Elstad's reasoning supports Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion that counsel's presence at post-indictment interrogation is needed to provide the accused with necessary information and advice. In addition to its faulty application of Elstad, the Patterson Court also failed to take into account-during its "pragmatic approach" 2 5 1 -the full practical merits of requiring accused's counsel to be present at post-indictment questioning. Removing defending counsel from certain post-indictment interrogations is disadvantageous to the state because any benefits that would result from defending counsel's presence are eclipsed. For instance, if the accused's counsel is present at post-indictment questioning, the inherent ethical dangers arising from the interplay of a prosecutor and 244 Id. at 316. 245 Furthermore, requiring the notification or presence of an accused's attorney during post-indictment questioning may also serve to expedite the criminal process. When an accused erroneously assesses his or her situation and concludes that remaining silent is the best alternative, at least one study has shown that counsel, believing otherwise, would urge an accused to cooperate in a number of circumstances.
57
It might be argued by the majority that, regardless of these advantages, mandatory notification or attendance would hinder most criminal cases. Presumably this argument would be based on the importance of interrogation as a needed step toward achieving a conviction, most likely resulting from admissions or confessions. Although there is some merit to this contention, studies have shown that the outcome of a case is generally not contingent on or determined by the fruits of interrogation. 258 
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that the formula offered by the dissent does not erase the opportunity for law enforcement officials to secure a confession, or similarly incriminating statements, if the officials deem it necessary to prosecution. This elicitation can still take place during pre-indictment stages or in the presence of counsel at post-indictment questioning. 2 59 In contrast, the disadvantage of the majority's rule is that protection of an accused's sixth amendment right to counsel-critically emphasized in Powell and its progeny-must take a backseat to "law enforcement unfettered by process concerns." 26 0 This result is entirely unnecessary if the dissent's position is forwarded.
1
In addition, Patterson dealt with prosecutorial interrogation, occurring after indictment. Because the filing of an indictment "presumably signals the government's conclusion that it has sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case," 26 2 then "authorities are no longer trying 'to solve a crime.'"263 Therefore, the need to elicit cantly, the evidence obtained by the President's Commission indicates that this is true of other cities as well.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
259 In addition, interrogation is only one of the vehicles open to the police in order to elicit necessary information. "Several comparative studies of clearance rates imply that investigative alternatives to interrogation are not only available but are successfully resorted to by law enforcement agencies when judicial rulings restrict or inhibit the use of interrogations and confessions." Id. at 1580 n.161. 260 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2402 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 261 It might be argued that the dissent's formula would provide an incentive for law enforcement officials to delay the filing of formal charges in order to maintain the opportunity to interrogate the defendant in the absence of counsel. This would be a clear disadvantage of the dissent's formula were it not for the existence of statutes of limitations which often define clear timetables within which the suspect must be charged. Furthermore, when these timetables are abused, the holding of United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1972) that the government's interest in obtaining such evidence is reduced because any questioning of the defendant by the government can only be for the purpose of buttressing a prima facie case . . . rests upon an unrealistic view of the criminal justice process. While in -some instances the government's case is complete at the time of indictment, there are many instances in which charges must be brought after probable cause is established but before the investigation is complete. Even when the prosecution believes that it has sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction, the vagaries of the jury system are such that the prospect of a conviction does not ap-incriminating evidence or a confession, "to buttress the government's case" after indictment, is suspect as an erroneous reason to remove the presence of an accused's counsel at post-indictment questioning.
264
Moreover, as Justice Stevens points out in his dissenting opinion, there are policy reasons of "unequaled strength" which mandate that an accused's attorney should be either notified or present during post-indictment prosecutorial interrogation; 2 65 not the least of which is the fundamentally altered relationship between the state and the defendant once formal charges have been filed.
Coupled with Justice Stevens' policy concerns, is Justice Blackmun's view that "the Sixth Amendment does not allow the prosecution to take undue advantage of any gap between the commencement of the adversary process and the time at which counsel is appointed for a defendant. ' 266 This concern of Justice Blackmun extends beyond the mere disadvantage suffered by Patterson in this case. Forcing the state to prove itself in an arena which is defined by adversarial forces, is at the base of our judicial system's truth-determining process. The purpose of the sixth amendment is to assure that in any "criminal prosecutio[n]," 26 7 the accused shall not be left to his own devices in facing the " 'prosecutorial forces of organized society.' "268 By its very terms, it becomes applicable only when the government's role shifts from investigation to accusation. For it is only then that the assistance of one versed in the "intricacies of... law," 26 9 is needed to assure that proach certainty until the government's evidence crosses the line between a strong case and an overwhelming one. For that reason, the investigative process often continues after the commencement of adversary proceedings as the prosecution seeks to present the strongest possible case at trial. The strength of the dissenting opinions, in conjunction with the rationale proffered in this Note, lead to the conclusion that Patterson did not "knowingly and intelligently" waive his sixth amendment right to have counsel present at post-indictment questioning, regardless of the majority's attempt to narrowly carve out an exception to the "presumption against waiver" previously established by the Court. 2 7 1 In summary, the rationale of the majority's holding in Patterson v. Illinois is erroneous because it fails to follow the underlying principles of precedent, and runs counter to the substantive, procedural, ethical and policy concerns of our adversary system.
E. THE EFFECTS OF PATTERSON ON SIXTH AMENDMENT WAIVERS WHERE THE DEFENDANT IS NOT TOLD OF HIS INDICTMENT
In reaching its decision, the Patterson Court expressly declined to rule on the issue of "whether or not an accused must be told that he has been indicted before a postindictment Sixth Amendment waiver will be valid."
27 2 This Note, although recognizing that the reasoning in Patterson may lead a subsequent Court to answer this question negatively, concludes that, if an accused must be made aware of the consequences he or she faces by waiving his or her right to counsel, then informing the accused of the indictment is necessary. The majority maintains that Miranda warnings apprise the accused of the "ultimate adverse consequence"-that anything he or she might say can be used against him or her at trial. 273 This is not enough, however, to make the accused sufficiently aware of the "dangers and disadvantages of self-representation" 27 4 so that the accused's waiver will be "made with eyes open." 2 75 One inadequacy of the Miranda warnings is that they do not inform an accused that criminal litigation is impending. This omission might cause the accused to underestimate the strength of the government's case against him or her and, concomitantly, the prudence of requesting counsel's aid. Even though the accused may be aware of the ultimate adverse consequence of his or her waiver, by virtue of the Mi- randa warnings, the accused's eyes are not open to the fact that this ultimate adverse consequence is forthcoming-a fact that would be communicated by informing him or her of the indictment. In evaluating the benefits or necessity of counsel at the interrogational stage, or at any post-indictment stage, an accused certainly needs to be aware that the government has secured enough evidence to establish a prima facie case 2 76 and that the "prosecutorial forces of organized society" 27 7 have been mobilized against him or her. Therefore, only by additionally informing the accused that formal charges have been filed, and consequently, that the "the government has committed itself to prosecute," 278 can the accused properly assess the benefits of counsel "with eyes open." 279 A decision which had made "knowledge of indictment" a procedural requirement for a valid sixth amendment waiver would have been more consistent with the holdings of Powell and its progeny which have critically emphasized the filing of formal charges as a major alteration in the relationship between the defendant and the state in the criminal process. 28 0 Likewise, such a decision would be in keeping with the reasoning of lower courts that have upheld the efficacy of the fifth amendment formula. 28 1 Those courts, like the Illinois Supreme Court in Patterson, 28 2 interpreted the sixth amendment right to counsel as requiring that the accused, in addition to the Miranda warnings, must be made aware "of the gravity of his situation" before a valid waiver can be properly executed. 28 3 According to these courts, one is aware of the gravity of the situation when one has been told of his or her indictment.
would merely have to precede the warnings they must normally administer with a statement concerning the accused's indictment. 28 5 In Patterson's case, Officer Gresham disposed of this requirement by simply informing Patterson "that a Grand Jury indictment had just been handed down" 28 6 and that he had been charged with the offense of "murder and armed violence." 28 7 Furthermore, the lesson in Wheat v. United States 28 8 is particularly applicable to this issue. In Wheat, the Supreme Court held that the "courts have an independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them." 28 9 Witholding pertinent information from an accused about his or her status-in effect keeping the accused guessing about information that could be easily conveyed-and calling upon him or her to make critical decisions without the benefit of this knowledge will certainly be viewed by the public as unfair. One can imagine the effect on a jury that would result from the following examination at trial: Question: "Why didn't you tell the defendant that he had been indicted and was now facing the mobilized prosecutorial forces of the state so that he could properly evaluate the benefits of counsel given all the relevant facts?" Answer: "Because he didn't ask me."
The danger of Patterson is that a strict and myopic application of the majority's reasoning might obviate the need for such indictment-knowledge. In Patterson, the majority reasoned that the virtual identity between a post-indictment defendant who fails to exercise his or her sixth amendment right to counsel, and a preindictee who has also declined to request representation, as well as the similarity
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of a lawyer's function in the two contexts, supports the conclusion that the fifth amendment formula should suffice to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver of the two rights. 2 90 In doing so, the Patterson majority distanced itself from the precedents which underscored the important differences between the fifth and sixth amendment rights to counsel. Further, even though the Court was not addressing the issue of whether indictment-knowledge is necessary, it did hold that there is little else, if anything, which could be added to the Miranda warnings in order to more clearly apprise the accused of the consequences of his or her waiver.
1
In light of these identities, drawn by the majority from the fifth and sixth amendment settings, and the Court's unwillingness to augment the Miranda warnings, it is conceivable that the Court would refuse to make a partial retreat from this reasoning and hold, in a later case, that an accused does not have to be additionally informed that formal charges have been filed against him or her.
V. CONCLUSION
In Patterson v. Illinois, the Supreme Court significantly withdrew from prior cases which have emphasized the need to protect an accused's right to counsel at every stage of the adversary proceeding. The Court held that the sixth amendment right to counsel is not violated by the occurrence of uncounseled, state-initiated, post-indictment interrogation, provided that it is preceded by a "knowing and intelligent" waiver by the accused. 29 2 According to the Court, a valid waiver in this context is evidenced by proper state administration of the accused's Miranda warnings.
The Court's holding is erroneous because it is premised on two individually faulty equations formulated by the majority: an analogy between counsel's function at pre-indictment questioning and counsel's function at post-indictment interrogation; and, an analogy between Patterson-a post-indictment accused-and a pre-indictment suspect. These equivalencies, established by the majority, are erroneous for a number of reasons, not the least of which are the substantive, procedural, and policy-oriented differences which divide the fifth and sixth amendment stages of the criminal process.
The effect of the Supreme Court's holding in Patterson v. Illinois is disturbing. The Court's determination to find a waiver, and its application of the fifth amendment formula for waiver to a sixth 290 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2389-99. 291 Id. at 2395-96. 292 Id. at 2396-97.
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[Vol. 79 amendment context, will have the unfortunate effect of increasing the chance that a post-indictee's right to counsel will be compromised at other critical stages of the adversary process. The only comforting factor-if it can be called that-is the narrow application of this holding, which restricts the scope of Patterson to situations in which the accused is in a post-indictment, interrogational setting, and has been told of his or her indictment.
